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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) . This is an 
appeal from a final judgment of the Second Judicial District 
Court over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
As stated in his Brief before the Court, Mr. Whetman, 
contends that the Trial Court abused its discretion in its 
division of the marital assets in this case. Specifically, Mr. 
Whetman contends the Trial Court gave undue weight to the fact 
that he executed a Quit Claim Deed deeding the marital home 
from himself, to himself and Mrs. Whetman, as joint owners of 
the property. Mr. Whetman believes that the Trial Court abused 
its discretion when it divided equally between the parties the 
marital residence equity. 
Accordingly, the sole issue presently before the Court is 
whether the Trial Court's decision to divide the equity in the 
marital residence equally between the parties should be 
disturbed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court has plainly held that "there is no fixed 
formula upon which to determine a division of property in a 
divorce action; the Trial Court has considerable latitude in 
adjusting financial and property interests, and its actions are 
entitled to a presumption of validity." Naranio v. Naranjo. 751 
P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah App. 1988). This Court has further 
stated that it "will not disturb the Trial Court's decision 
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concerning property division unless it is clearly unjust or a 
clear abuse of discretion" Shepherd v. Shepherd 876 P.2d 429, 
433 (Utah App 1994) (quoting Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 66 
(Utah App 1991), cert denied). 
In Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980), the 
Supreme Court further stated: 
"In a divorce case, even though the proceedings are 
equitable and this Court may review the evidence, 
this Court accords considerable deference to the 
findings and judgment of the Trial Court due to its 
advantageous position. On appeal this Court will 
not disturb the action of the Trial Court unless the 
evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary, or 
the Trial Court has abused its discretion, or 
misapplied principals of law." Fletcher at 1222. 
DETERMINATIVE UTAH STATUTES 
With respect to pre-marital agreements, the Uniform Pre-
marital Agreement Act provides: 
(1) parties to a pre-marital agreement may contract 
with respect to: 
(a) the rights and obligations of each of the 
parties in any of the property of either or both of them 
whenever and wherever acquired or located. 
U.C.A. §30-8-4 (1994). 
Although the parties agreement in this case, deeding the 
marital home as joint property, occurred after the parties 
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marriage, Utah court's review postnuptial property agreements 
under the same standards as those applied to prenuptial 
agreements. See D'Aston v. D'Aston 808 P. 2d 111, 113 (Utah App. 
1990). Accordingly, Mrs. Whetman argues that the parties 
postnuptial agreement to deed the marital home as joint 
property is valid and enforceable under the uniform Pre-marital 
Agreement Act as contained in Utah Code Section 30-8-1. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and Defendant were married and became husband 
and wife on February 18, 1994. Although Plaintiff has four (4) 
children from a previous marriage, and Defendant has two (2) 
children from a previous marriage, no children were born as 
issue of this marriage. 
The parties separated, following marital disputes that 
culminated and became more severe, on June 23, 1996. As a 
result of the parties marital difficulties, Plaintiff filed a 
Complaint for Divorce on June 27, 1996. 
On May 6, 1997, a Trial was held before Judge Glen R. 
Dawson in connection with Plaintiff's Complaint for Divorce. 
Following a Trial on this matter, the Trial Court granted Mrs. 
Whetman a Decree of Divorce based upon irreconcilable 
differences. Mrs. Whetman was further awarded a judgement in 
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her favor and against Mr. Whetman in the amount of $53,235.50 
as her share of the equity in the marital residence. See 
Findings of Fact at page 6. 
In its Findings of Fact, the Trial Court found that, at 
the time of the parties' marriage, Plaintiff had pre-marital 
assets in the approximate amount of $35,000.00, and Defendant 
had pre-marital assets in the approximate amount of $97,000.00. 
See Findings of Fact at page 3. The Trial Court further found 
that the parties mutually agreed to join together their 
respective assets and to share those assets jointly and 
equally. Id. 
In addition, the Court found that, in accordance with the 
parties' agreement to join and share their respective assets 
jointly and equally, Plaintiff left her home, job, and much of 
her furnishings to enter into this marriage. Id. The Court 
further found that Plaintiff had joined all of her pre-marital 
property into the joint benefit of the parties, and became the 
primary caretaker of all of the children; as was consistent 
with the desire of both parties. IdL Similarly, the Court 
found that Defendant joined all his assets into the marriage 
with the intent to share them equally with the Plaintiff. See 
Findings of Fact at page 3. 
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More specifically, the Trial Court found that Defendant 
knowingly and intelligently signed a Quit Claim Deed on the 
marital home from himself individually, to the parties equally, 
as joint owners. See Findings of Fact at page 4. The Trial 
Court expressly found that this action by the Defendant was 
consistent with the parties' actions in joining all of their 
assets into marital property. Id. 
The Court found no evidence that the Defendant signed the 
Quit Claim Deed under coercion, force, fraud, mistake, or any 
other circumstance or for any other reason that would make it 
void, voidable, or unenforceable. JEd. Furthermore, the Court 
found that the Defendant intended the Quit Claim Deed to have 
legal consequence, and that the Defendant intentionally signed 
the Deed after having read it, and having requested that it be 
prepared. Id. 
The Court's findings further stated that the Court 
reviewed case law submitted by the parties, conducted its own 
research, and was aware of the Court's discretion to award an 
unequal division of property or to disregard legal title of a 
marital asset, but found no facts consistent with the case law 
that justified anything other than an equal split of the 
marital residence equity. See Findings of Fact at page 5. As 
a result, the Court found that the equity in the marital 
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residence should be divided equally, and that the Plaintiff was 
entitled to payment from the Defendant for her share of the 
equity in the marital residence in the amount of $53,235.50. 
Defendant is now appealing the Trial Court's decision to 
divide equally the marital residence equity. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At the time of the parties marriage, each party came into 
the marriage with a substantial premarital assets. Although 
the value of the premarital assets brought into the marriage by 
both parties were not entirely equal, the parties mutually 
agreed to join together their respective assets and to share 
those assets jointly and equally for the benefit of their new 
family. 
In furtherance of this agreement, Mrs. Whetman left her 
job, home and furnishings, and placed all of her premarital 
assets into joint property of the parties. In addition to her 
contributing nearly $15,000.00 as proceeds from her premarital 
home to the parties joint account, Mrs. Whetman also cashed in 
all of her premarital retirement benefits so that Mr. Whetman 
could invest these funds in an attempt to parlay funds into a 
sizeable fortune for the family's benefit. A fortune, that if 
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ever realized, Mr. Whetman would have surely shared in equally 
due to the parties agreement. 
Now however, in connection with the parties divorced, Mr. 
Whetman contends that, in spite of ample evidence established 
in the parties practice of joining their assets, coupled with 
the fact that he deeded the marital home to the parties as 
joint owners sometime after they were married, he did not 
intend to share this premarital asset jointly or equally. 
Such an argument is clearly unpersuasive in light of the 
clear and convincing evidence presented at Trial establishing 
that the parties had an agreement to commingle all their assets 
and share those assets jointly and equally. In light of this 
evidence, the Trial Court made a reasonable and proper decision 
to divide the equity in the marital home equally between the 
parties. As such the Trial Court's decision should not be 
disturbed upon review. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES 
WAS TO PUT ALL THE PARTIES ASSETS INTO JOINT OWNERSHIP. 
The parties were married on February 18, 1994. At the 
time of their marriage, each party had a significant amount of 
pre-marital assets. However, the evidence presented at Trial 
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clearly established that it was the intent and agreement of the 
parties, even before they were married, to commingle their 
assets and share those assets jointly and equally and to join 
their two families together as one. 
At Trial it was clearly established that, in accordance 
with the parties mutual agreement, the parties did in fact join 
all of their assets together. For instance, Mrs. Whetman 
testified that, at Mr. Whetman's request, she left her home 
from a previous marriage (even though the payments on the home 
were being made by her former husband) and the majority of her 
furnishings accumulated during her previous marriage when she 
entered into the marriage. See Transcript at page 134-135. 
Furthermore, Mrs. Whetman testified that she received 
approximately $14,800.00 from her former husband as her share 
of the equity in this pre-marital property and placed this 
entire amount into the parties joint checking account in 
furtherance of this agreement. See Transcript at page 135 and 
138. 
Mr. Whetman himself admitted at Trial that every asset 
that Mrs. Whetman owned prior to the marriage became joint 
property. When examined in this regard, Mr. Whetman stated: 
Q BY MR. BRANCH: Answer it, isn't it true that 
every single assets that you know of that she owned 
became joint property? 
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A: She put in her van— 
Q: We don't want to know what she put in, I am 
asking you, did she withhold any asset at all? 
A: No. 
Transcript at pp 35-36. 
In addition, Mrs. Whetman testified that she also quit her 
job as part of the agreement between the parties to join the 
two families together as one, with Mrs. Whetman being the 
caretaker of the parties' children. See Transcript, at page 
133. The evidence at Trial further established that Mrs. 
Whetman traded in her pre-marital vehicle for approximately 
$5,500.00 and placed all of these funds into the parties' joint 
account as well. Id. 
In fact, the only pre-marital assets of both parties that 
were not commingled or placed in joint ownership at the time of 
the marriage, or shortly thereafter, were the marital home and 
Mrs. Whetman's shares of stock within her 401(k) retirement 
account. 
II 
MR. WHETMAN'S SIGNING OF THE QUIT CLAIM DEED AND MRS. WHETMAN'S 
STOCK COMPLETED AND EVIDENCED THE JOINT OWNERSHIP AGREEMENT OF 
THE PARTIES 
In June of 1995, approximately 16 months after the parties 
marriage, Mrs. Whetman's retirement benefits in the form of 442 
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shares of Questar stock, with an approximate value of 
$13,000.00, were brokered by the parties and placed into a 
joint mutual fund for investment purposes. The testimony of 
both parties established that Mrs. Whetman's stock was brokered 
and the approximate $13,000.00 was received and placed in the 
joint investment account so that the funds could be invested 
for the benefit of the parties marriage. Also during this time 
period, Mr. Whetman executed a Quit Claim Deed on the marital 
home, transferring ownership of the home from himself 
individually to the parties as joint tenants. 
Despite Mr. Whetman's protestations after the fact, the 
signing of the Quit Claim Deed by Mr. Whetman, along with the 
brokering of Mrs. Whetman's retirement benefits, were nothing 
more than a completion of the parties agreement to join and 
share the parties assets. 
For example, Mrs. Whetman testified regarding the transfer 
of the marital home to a joint assets as follows: 
Q: All right, now, at the time you 
married Mr. Whetman were there any 
discussions as to the home that he owned? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Tell us about those discussions. Did 
any of those discussions occur before you 
married him? 
A: Yes. 
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Q: Tell us what happened. 
A: It was just as we talked about what we 
were going to do with the assets from my 
home and his—we just had agreed that we 
would join everything together, that what 
was mine and what was his would become 
ours, and that the house would become a 
joint asset. 
Q: And so did he ever say, "No, the house 
is not included in that agreement but 
everything else is?" 
A: No, as far as I am concerned he always 
referred to it as our home, and that's how 
we felt that it was our home. 
Q: Now, did you do anything to effectuate 
that understanding at the time you 
married? Did you get a Deed or anything 
at that time? 
A: Not at that time. I would mention it 
every once in a while and something came 
through the mail once in a mortgage thing 
about insurance for the home and stuff, 
and I said, "Do we need to add my name to 
it now? " and I would ask him every once in 
a while, "Well, are we ever going to—when 
should we put my name on the Quit Claim 
it", or something. 
Q: What would he say when you would ask 
him those questions? 
A: He'd say that we'd get to it that he 
intended to do it, always did intend to do 
it, that it was my house and there was no 
problem. And I did voice the concern the 
of death because I figured I would be in 
charge of his girls if something was to 
happen to him and I wanted them to have a 
home, I didn't want anybody out on the 
street. 
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Q: Okay, and I assume he wanted the same 
thing? 
A: I am assuming, yeah. He said that it 
would be taken care of and that everything 
would be taken care of, to trust him. 
Transcript at pp 142-143. 
Mrs. Whetman further testified regarding the point in time 
in which the Quit Claim Deed was signed by Mr. Whetman: 
Q: Tell us why we finally got to the 
point that a Deed was signed, what 
happened? 
A: We were discussing turning the Questar 
stock over into the Charles Schwab account 
because it was a joint account and the 
certificate thus far was in my name. And 
I said, "Well, when we turn this over to 
the joint account, why don't we take care 
of everything at once and get the home 
deeded to both of us and put this in the 
Charles Schwab account and that way 
everything will be jointly owned." 
Q: Everything would be done— 
A: Everything would be done and basically 
everything would be taken care that we 
discussed previously. 
Q: Alright, and did, what did John say 
when you said that? 
A: He said, "Fine, call Gretchen and 
let's get it done." 
Transcript at pp 144. 
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Mr. Whetman testified regarding the signing of the Quit 
Claim Deed as follows: 
Q: . . . question on Line 18 was, "And 
when you signed that deed, did you have an 
opportunity to read that Deed." And your 
answer was? 
A: "I suppose so." 
Q: And then on Line 21 I asked you, "Did 
you request that it be prepared?" And you 
answer was? 
A: "Julie and I both requested it, yes." 
Q: All right. Does that refresh your 
memory that both of you requested this 
Deed be prepared, not just Julie? 
A: I suppose so. 
Transcript at pp 31. 
Therefore, it is clear from the testimony of both parties 
that both the signing of the Quit Claim Deed, and the brokering 
of the shares of stock, were requested and executed by both 
parties for the benefit of the parties marriage. These actions 
by the parties were nothing more than a completion or 
continuation of the parties' agreement to join their assets and 
to share equally in their benefit. 
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Ill 
THE QUIT CLAIM DEED EXECUTED BY MR. WHETMAN IS A VALID AND 
ENFORCEABLE POSTMARITAL AGREEMENT UNDER UTAH LAW 
The simple fact of the matter is, in June of 1995, Mr. 
Whetman did in fact execute a Quit Claim Deed to the marital 
home transferring ownership of the property from himself 
individually to the parties as joint tenants. This Deed was, 
in and of itself, a clear and unambiguous agreement to share 
equally in the ownership of the property that was supported by 
ample consideration, and was properly enforced by the Trial 
Court. 
This Court has clearly stated that prenuptial, as well as 
postnuptial, agreements are enforceable in Utah absent fraud, 
coercion, or material nondisclosure. See D'Aston, supra at 113. 
Furthermore, when interpreting such agreements, Utah Courts 
apply general contract principals. Jd. Thus, under Utah law, a 
post-marital agreement should be treated like any other 
contract. Berman v. Berman, 749 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah App. 
1988) . 
In the case at bar, the Trial Court looked to the four 
corners of the Quit Claim Deed to determine the intent of the 
parties. The Trial Court found that the language of the 
document clearly and unambiguously expressed the desire of the 
parties to share in joint ownership of the property. Moreover, 
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the Trial Court properly determined that ample consideration 
existed in support of the agreement due to the commingling of 
all of Mrs. Whetman's assets. 
More importantly, however, is the fact that no evidence 
was ever presented by Mr. Whetman that the Quit Claim Deed was 
executed due to fraud or coercion, or that material facts were 
not fully disclosed to him. In fact, Mr. Whetman himself 
testified that both he and Mrs. Whetman requested that the Deed 
be prepared, that he read the Deed, that he was aware that the 
Deed was a legal document, that he was aware that the Deed had 
legal effect, and that he requested that the Deed be recorded. 
See Transcript at pages 30-33. 
Although Mr. Whetman claimed after the fact that he was 
"badgered" or "harassed" by Mrs. Whetman to sign the Quit Claim 
Deed, the Trial Court found no evidence of fraud, or that Mr. 
Whetman was coerced into signing the document. Rather, the 
Trial Court properly found that the signing of the Quit Claim 
Deed was only a further manifestation of the parties mutual 
agreement and intent to join together their assets for the 
benefit of their family. 
Although Mr. Whetman testified that a reason for signing 
the Quit Claim Deed was to provide for Mrs. Whetman and his 
children in the event of his death, the Trial Court found no 
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evidence whatsoever that the parties intended for all that was 
put into the marriage to somehow be divided back out in the 
event the parties were divorced. Instead, the Trial Court 
properly found that the signing of the Quit Claim Deed from 
himself to the parties equally, as joint owners, was consistent 
with the parties previous actions and agreement to join all of 
their assets into marital property and to join their two 
families together. As such, Mr. Whetman's argument that the 
Trial Court should have performed some sort of financial 
gymnastics to return the parties to their pre-marital status, 
just because it did not become necessary for Mrs. Whetman to 
care for Mr. Whetman's children, is clearly unpersuasive, 
unsupported by Utah law and cuts against established public 
policy. 
IV 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO RESTORE THE PARTIES TO 
THEIR PREMARITAL STATUS 
This Court has clearly stated that "there is no fixed 
formula upon which to determine a division of property in a 
divorce action." Naranio, supra at 1146. In regard to the 
division of property, in a divorce action, the Supreme Court 
has stated: 
"Pre-marital property, gifts, and inheritances may 
be viewed as separate property, and in appropriate 
circumstances, equity will require that each party 
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will retain the separate property brought into the 
marriage. However, that rule is not invariable. In 
fashioning an equitable property division, Trial 
Courts need consider all the pertinent 
circumstances." Burke v. Burke 733 P. 2d 133, 135 
(Utah 1987)(emphasis added). 
Therefore, in the present case, the Trial Court was not 
required to restore the parties to their premarital status with 
respect to the division of property. Instead, the Trial Court 
was only required to consider all the pertinent circumstances 
of this case. 
After hearing testimony from both parties, argument of 
counsel, and having considered ample amounts of additional 
evidence in this case concerning the relevant circumstances of 
the signing of the Quit Claim Deed, the Court properly 
determined that Mr. Whetman's execution of the Deed was 
consistent with the parties agreement to join assets, forces, 
and energies in this marriage. In support of such a finding, 
the Court stated as follows: 
THE COURT: Well, there is evidence from 
Plaintiff's testimony that their agreement 
was that they would join assets, forces, 
and energies to make a good home for six 
children and a happy marriage for two 
people. 
MR THOMAS: But Mr. Whetman— 
THE COURT: That's fairly credible 
evidence to me, I have to tell you that. 
MR. THOMAS: I understand. 
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THE COURT: I mean it's common, it's not 
an unnatural thing when two people get 
together to have that as a common goal, 
THE COURT: I hear what you are saying. 
Let me tell you what I am having trouble 
with. As I view the evidence my best view 
is the most logical view, and I understand 
again, love is strange and it's not always 
logical, is that the evidence appears to 
show me that there was an agreement to 
work together, to join forces. The 
signature on the Deed, the preparation of 
the Deed was part of that plan. Part of 
the reason I am feeling that way is 
because I have not been given a good 
reason by the Defendant as to why he 
signed that otherwise. To say someone 
hounded you would not cause someone, it 
seems to me, reasonably to sign away 
something he did not want to sign away. 
Transcript at pp 272-274. 
These statements by the Trial Court clearly demonstrate 
that the Court's decision to divide equally the equity in the 
marital home was not made automatically or arbitrarily, or that 
the Court placed an inordinate amount of weights on the signing 
on the Quit Claim Deed. Rather, the Trial Court considered all 
of the evidence presented and reasonably determined that the 
signing of the Quit Claim Deed was consistent with the parties 
agreement and intent to work together. In fact, in light of 
all the evidence presented, any finding by the Trial Court to 
the contrairy would have clearly been an arbitrary decision and 
a misapplication of Utah law. 
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CONCLUSION 
There was more than sufficient evidence before the Trial 
Court to support its finding that an agreement existed between 
the parties to commingle their assets and to share them jointly 
and equally. As such, the Trial Court reasonably and properly 
determined that the Defendant's intentional and willful signing 
of the Quit Claim Deed was in furtherance of such an agreement, 
and that the equity from the home should therefore be divided 
between the parties. Such decision by the Trial Court is 
reasonable and proper, and should therefore not be disturbed. 
ADDENDUM 
Attached. 
Respectfully submitted this 1 <^  day of August 1998. 
i,, w—A 
MA^KTP. HE&ERMAN 
Attorney foV Plaintiff 
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TOM D. BRANCH (3997) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JULIA L. WHETMAN 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN D. WHETMAN, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AHD 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 964701115 
JUDGE MJf-HAFT. G ALLPHTN 
This matter came on for Evidentiary Trial before Judge Dawson 
on May 6, 1997. A follow up hearing on Defendant's Objections to 
the Decree was held on July 13, 1997. Both parties appeared in 
person together with their respective counsel, Tom D. Branch for 
the Plaintiff and Douglas B. Thomas for the Defendant. Following 
the trial in the matter, the Court made the following Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
1 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties, in January of 1997, entered into a 
Stipulation which was memorialized in a Pre-Trial Order signed and 
entered by this Court on January 16, 1997 by Judge Allphin. The 
terms of that Pre-Trial Order are incorporated herein and are 
effective as of the date of that Order and are binding on the 
parties. 
2. Plaintiff was a bona fide resident of Davis County, 
Ctate of Utah, for more than three months preceding the 
commencement of this action. This Court has jurisdiction and venue 
is proper. 
3. Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife having 
been married on February 18, 1994. 
4. The Plaintiff has four children from a prior 
marriage, ages 18, 17, 15 and 9. The Defendant has two children 
from a prior marriage, ages 12 and 8. There are no children born 
as issue of this marriage. 
5. The parties separated, following marital disputes 
that culminated and became more severe, on June 23, 1996, and have 
remained separated since that time. During the course of the 
itidj,iicige, the parries aeveiopea irreconcilable differences making 
the continuation of their marriage impractical and against both 
their desires. The Court finds reasonable grounds for granting the 
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Plaintiff a divorce based upon those irreconcilable differences. 
A Decree of Divorce should be granted to the Plaintiff on the 
grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
6. A Decree of Divorce should become final upon entry. 
7. At the time the parties married, the Plaintiff had 
pre-marital assets in the approximate amount of $35,000.00, and the 
Defendant had pre-martial assets in the approximate amount of 
$97,^00.00. The parties mutually agreed to join together their 
respective assets and to share those assets jointly and equally. 
Both parties agreed to provide all of their energies, assets, and 
efforts to join their two families together as one and to raise the 
children 
8. Consistent with that agreement, the parties did join 
their assets together. The Plaintiff gave all she had to this 
marriage. The Plaintiff left her home, job, and much of her 
furnishings to enter into this marriage, joined all of her pre-
marital property into the joint benefit of the parties, and became 
the primary care taker of all of the children, as was consistent 
with the desire of both parties. 
9. The Defendant also joined his assets into this 
marriage with the intent to share them equally with the Plaintiff. 
10. The parties took up residence in the Defendants pre-
marital home which had substantial pre-marital equity at the time. 
3 
However, in June of 1995, and consistent with the parties agreement 
to join assets, the Defendant signed a Quit Claim Deed on the home 
from himself to the parties equally, as joint owners. This action 
by the Defendant was consistent with the parties actions in joining 
all of their assets into marital property, and this action 
transferred the home into marital property. 
11 The Defendant signed the Quit Claim Deed wLlshout 
coercion, force, fraud, mistake, nor under any circumstance or for 
any reason that would make it void, voidable or unenforceable. No 
public policy was violated by the Defendant signing the Deed. The 
Court finds the Defendant could have refused to sign the Quit Claim 
Deed but did not. The Court finds that the Defendant executed the 
Deed to further the parties agreement as indicated herein and for 
no other reason that would cause this Court under case law to not 
enforce the legal impact of the Deed. 
12. The Court finds that the Defendant intended the Quit 
Claim Deed to have legal consequence and that he expressed that he 
wanted to make sure that his wife and all of the children were 
taken care of at his death. The Defendant signed the Deed 
knowingly and intelligently. The Defendant intentionally signed 
the Deed after having read it, requested it be prepared, and 
knowing full well its legal consequences. There was adequate 
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consideration for the Deed. The Defendant asked that the Deed be 
recorded and the Deed was recorded. 
13. The Court is not convinced that there are any facts 
in this case that would justify a division of the equity in the 
marital residence in any other percentage than equally. The Court 
reviewed case law submitted by the parties, conducted its own 
research, and is aware of the Court's discretion to award £n 
unequal division of property or to disregard ^  legal title of a 
marital asset, but finds no facts consistent with the case law that 
would justify anything other than an equal split of the marital 
residence equity. 
14. The Court finds that the fair market value of the 
residence is $290,000.00. The Court reviewed the testimony of the 
expert appraisers and all other persons testifying concerning the 
value and finds that equity requires that the value be set as 
indicated. 
15. The Court finds there is a first mortgage in the 
amount of $162,574.00 and a line of credit in a second secured 
position against the home in the amount of $20,955.00. The Court 
has deducted and not given credit for the $1,000.00 on the line of 
credit taken out by the Defendant after separation. 
16. The Court finds that the equity to be divided in the 
home is $106,471.00 and that the equity should be divided equally 
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and that the Plaintiff should therefore be entitled to payment from 
the Defendant for her share of the equity in the martial residence 
the amount of $53,235.50. The Defendant should be awarded the home 
subject to this obligation. 
17. The Plaintiff should be awarded a Judgment in the 
amount of the equity in the marital residence. The Defendant is 
awarded the residence subject to Plaintiff's judgment. The 
Defendant should make immediate good fditli effort to refinance and 
should pay the Judgment as follows: A lump sum payment payable to 
Plaintiff and her attorney, Tom D. Branch, in the amount of 
$20,000.00 due on or before the 1st day September, 1997. The 
balance of the Judgment should be paid on a monthly basis, for the 
first five (5) years with the first payment due October 1, 1997, 
and the full balance of the Judgment, together with interest at the 
now present Judgment interest rate, to be paid in full on or before 
September 1, 2002. The monthly payments between September 1, 1997 
and September 1, 2002 should be calculated using the balance of the 
judgment owed after the down payment of $20,000.00 amortized over 
10 years. The Court will hold a telephone conference on September 
2, 1997 at 8:30 a.m. to discuss the status of the refinance 
«£f ori-s. 
18. The Court further finds that the Corolla automobile 
in question herein should be awarded to the Defendant who will be 
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responsible for all costs and debt related to that vehicle. The 
Defendant should hold harmless the Plaintiff on the Corolla debt. 
The Plaintiff should have deducted $1,500.00 from her judgment on 
the home equity as set forth above as a contribution for her share 
of the Corolla debt. If there have been any double payments as the 
parties testified to concerning the Corolla lease payments, the 
Deiendant shall be entitled to the credit for those overpayments, 
19. Each party will be responsible to cooperate in the 
effectuation of this Courts ruling and in signing any and all 
aocuments necessary to put into place the effect of the Court's 
ruling. 
20. Concerning the parties dispute on personal property, 
the parties are awarded the following: 
TO THE PLAINTIFF 
a. All items in paragraph 2 of Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 4 including subparagraphs a through t. 
b. All items in Defendant's Exhibit 8 under title 
"Items to Julia" numbers 1 through 10 
a. All items set forth in Defendant's Exhibit 8 
under "Items to John" numbers 1 through 7. 
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b. All other items currently in the home not 
otherwise specifically awarded to the Plaintiff 
herein. 
21. The Court finds that the Defendant should 
immediately make available the personal property awarded to 
Plaintiff for her pick up. The Plaintiff should be allowed to 
package and remove•her own property items. 
22. Neither party is awarded attorney's fees and eafch 
are responsible to pay their own fees and costs in this matter. 
The Court finds that both of the attorney's fees were reasonable 
CLIIKJL necejD&cirij.y mcurrea, out in light ot equitable discretion, theT 
Court finds considering the division of property set forth herein 
that each par*-y should pay their own attorney's fees. 
23. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has a gross 
income of $1,300.00 per month and the Defendant has a gross income 
of $3,300.00 per month. The Court reviewed the expenses of both 
parties and took those into consideration in its ruling on 
attorney's fees. 
24. The Plaintiff should be awarded one half of the 
stock account in the amount $1,150.00. If the account was in 
bAxoubuce on MMovenujer 12, 199*6, uetendant should pay immediately 
the $1,150.00 to Plaintiff. If the account was sold prior to 
November 19, 1996 as represented by Defendant the Plaintiff should 
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be entitled to a Judgment for the $1,150.00 payable as an addition 
to the Judgment previously granted for Plaintiff's share of the 
home equity, and on the same terms. 
25. On the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisciction over the parties and this 
action. 
2. The Plaintiff should be awarded a Decree of Divorce 
to become final upon entry. 
3. The Decree of Divorce should conform to these 
Findings and to the parties Pre-Trial Order which the Court 
specifically approves and incorporates herein as of its own date. 
Dated this 1 day of <Auguo-t, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
9 
DOUGLAS B. THOMAS 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Rule 4-504 Notice 
You and each of you, please take notice that pursuant to Rule 
4-504, Code Judicial Administration, a copy of the foregoing 
document has been mailed to each of you in accordance with the 
Certificate of Mailing. This proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW will be signed and entered by the Court uraless 
objected to within five (5) days of service of this document upon 
you. Any objections must be filed prior to that time. 
Dated this day of August, 1997. 
/ ^ ^ ^ / ^ ^ ^ ^ - ^ - ^ 
TDM D. BRANCH 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, hereby certify that I mailed the foregoing document on 
this 7' day of August, 1997 to: 
Douglas B. Thomas 
GRIDLEY, WARD, HAVAS, SHAW & THOMAS 
635 25tb Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
J^A ta x <^AAMXEAANC\AA 
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1 your deposition taken January 10th 1997? 
2 A I do. 
3 Q Do you remember being put under oath and answering 
4 questions about this case? 
5 A I do. 
6 Q Let me show you page 21, if I could, and along the 
7 left hand column are line numbers if you would look at that. 
8 If you'd start, let me grab a copy of that and I'll help you 
9 along with it. Question on Line 18 was, "And when you signed 
10 that deed, did you have an opportunity to read that deed." 
11 And your answer was? 
12 A "I suppose so." 
13 Q And then on Line 21 I asked you, "Did you request 
14 that it be prepared?" And your answer was? 
15 A "Julie and I both requested it, yes." 
16 Q All right. Does that refresh your memory that both 
17 of you requested this deed be prepared, not just Julie? 
18 A I suppose so. 
19 Q All right. Now, Mr. Whetman, isn't it true that 
2 0 when you signed this quitclaim deed that you understood that 
21 it was a legal document? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q That it had legal effect? 
24 A No. 
2 5 Q You did not understand that a legal document had 
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1 whatsoever about joining your assets together in any 
2 capacity, is that your testimony? 
3 A My testimony is that there's no such arrangement. 
4 Q All right. Then let's talk about what actually 
5 happened. Isn't it true, Mr. Whetman, that every single 
6 asset that Mrs. Whetman had at the time she came into this 
7 J marriage was put into joint ownership? 
8 MR. THOMAS: Objection, Your Honor, I need to have 
9 that narrowed with respect to time. 
10 MR. BRANCH: No, there's no timeframe on it. 
11 MR. THOMAS: So you're just stating during the 
12 marriage at some point? 
13 MR. BRANCH: Yes. 
14 I THE COURT: Well, I thought the question as the 
15 marriage she began, everything she owned was joint, but--
16 MR. BRANCH: We can break it down, that's fine. I 
17 have no problem with that. 
18 THE COURT: I don't mean to tell you how to try 
19 your case. 
20 MR. BRANCH: Well, it's kind of hard because the 
21 assets kind of developed at different times; they sold the 
22 van a little bit later than the date of marriage, she 
23 received her money from her, you know, but--
24 THE COURT: He's withdrawn his objection, go ahead. 
25 Q BY MR. BRANCH: Answer it, isn't it true that every 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
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single asset that you know of that she owned became joint 
property? 
A She put in her van--
Q We don't want to put in what she put in, I'm asking 
you, did she withhold any asset at all? 
A No. 
Q Let's talk about your assets for a minute. What 
assets did you not put into joint ownership? 
A I did not offer to give her half of my home. 
Q Is that the only one, every other asset that you 
had was put into joint ownership, wasn't it? 
A Technically, no, I had a boat that I didn't put her 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 I name on. 
14 Q Did you sell that boat? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q Did you make $200? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q Did you put that in the joint account? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q All right. Anything else? 
21 A I can't think of anything. 
22 Q All right. And then in June of 1995 you deeded the 
23 home to her as well, and you want this Court to believe that 
24 you didn't intend that to be a legally enforceable document? 
25 A That's correct. 
TabE 
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1 | Q All right. Now, at the time you married Mr. 
2 I Whetman were there any discussions as to the home that he 
3 I owned? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q Tell us about those discussions. Did any of those 
6 discussions occur before you married him? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q Tell us what happened. 
9 A It was just as we talked about what we were going 
10 to do with the assets from my home and his we just had agreed 
11 that we would join everything together, that what was mine 
12 and what was his would become ours, and that the house would 
13 become a joint asset. 
14 Q All right. And so did he ever say, "No, the house 
15 is not included in that agreement but everything else is?" 
16 A No, as far as I am concerned he always referred to 
17 it as our home, and that's how we felt that it was our home. 
18 Q Now, did you do anything to effectuate that 
19 understanding at the time you married? Did you get a deed or 
20 anything at that time? 
21 A Not at that time. I would mention it every once in 
22 awhile and something came through the mail once in a mortgage 
23 thing about insurance for the home and stuff, and I said, "Do 
24 we need to add my name to it now?" And I'd ask him every 
25 once in awhile, "Well, are we ever going to--when should we 
^
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1 put my name on the quitclaim it", or something. 
2 Q What would he say when you would ask him those 
3 questions? 
4 A He'd say we'd get to it, that he intended to do it, 
5 always did intend to do it, that it was my house and there 
6 was no problem. And I did voice the concern of death because 
7 I figured I would be in charge of his girls if something was 
8 to happen to him and I wanted them to have a home, I didn't 
9 want anybody out on the street. 
10 Q Okay. And I assume he wanted the same thing? 
11 A I'm assuming, yeah. He said that it would be taken 
12 care of and that everything would be taken care of, to trust 
13 him. 
14 Q All right. He never said anything to the effect 
15 that, "No, I'm not going to deed this house to you, that's 
16 not the understanding?" 
17 A No, no, never. 
18 Q He always gave you affirmative responses? 
19 A Yes, I always had the impression that he was more 
20 than happy to include me in sharing his home. 
21 Q In June of 1995, there was a quitclaim deed signed 
22 by Mr. Whetman, recorded by Mr. Whetman's request, that 
23 deeded the legal ownership of that home from him to both of 
24 you, do you remember that? 
25 A Yes, I do. 
X 
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1 I Q And I don't know if you have that exhibit in front 
2 I of you or not. 
3 1 A I don't. 
4 I Q Let me show you just a copy of the quitclaim deed. 
5 | A Okay. 
6 | Q Until we can put our finger on the original, is 
7 I that a copy of the quitclaim deed that you understood was 
signed in June of 1995? 
A Yes. 
10 I Q Tell us why we finally got to the point that a deed 
11 was signed, what happened? 
12 A We were discussing turning the Questar stock over 
13 into the Charles Schwab account because it was a joint 
14 I account and the certificate thus far was in my name. And I 
15 said, "Well, when we turn this over to the joint account, why 
16 don't we take care of everything at once at get the home 
17 deeded to both of us and put this in the Charles Schwab 
18 account and that way everything will be jointly owned." 
19 Q Everything would be done--
2 0 A Everything would be done and basically everything 
21 would be taken care of that we'd discussed previously. 
22 Q All right, and did, what did John say when you said 
23 that? 
24 A He said, "Fine, call Gretchen and let's get it 
2 5 done." 
-9-
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I'd like to point out that initially Mr. Whetman 
was also contributing things that he had, he had the travel 
that he took the kids on, he had the tax refunds, he had his 
checking account, all of that came in as well. I think it's 
important to note that they didn't get together and just say, 
"All right, we're going to make everything joined together 
here at once." They didn't do that, that never happened. 
There's no evidence that they ever got together and said, 
"All right, we're going to get everything together at the 
same time and we're going to take care of all of these 
things." She kept the stock in her own name for a year and a 
half. 
THE COURT: Well, there is evidence from 
plaintiff's testimony that their agreement was that they 
would join assets, forces, and energies to make a good home 
for six children and a happy marriage for two people. 
MR. THOMAS: But Mr. Whetman--
THE COURT: That's fairly credible evidence to me, 
I have to tell you that. 
MR. THOMAS: I understand. 
THE COURT: I mean it's common, it's not an 
unnatural thing when two people get together to have that as 
a common goal. 
MR. THOMAS: But I think it is an unnatural thing 
25 for someone to say, "All right, you can have in this very 
o> \
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1 I short term relationship one half of this $80,000 that has 
2 come from my wife's passing, that is my pre-marital 
3 property." That is something that would be very unnatural to 
4 take place. It was interesting to note from her testimony as 
5 well, she was talking about--
6 J THE COURT: Love causes one to do strange things. 
7| MR. THOMAS: But that shouldn't be fair, Your 
Honor, it should not be equitable to allow her to get this 
huge windfall because that's all it is. She coming into this 
10 | marriage with very few funds and she's going out with just 
11 | about the same. Now, he comes in and he's got, you know, a 
12 | position of about $98,000 and he's leaving with 70 even under 
13 | his proposal, okay? If you are to switch the tables and buy 
14 I inco their proposal he leaves with a substantially smaller 
15 amount, and that's not fair, it's not just, it's not 
16 equitable particularly when he brought all of that in. 
17 Suddenly all his children's inheritance basically from their 
18 mother is gone, it's vanished. 
19 THE COURT: I hear what you're saying. Let me tell 
2 0 you what I'm having trouble with. As I view the evidence my 
21 best view is the most logical view, and I understand again, 
22 love is strange and it's not always logical, is that the 
23 evidence appears to show me that there was an agreement to 
24 work together, to join forces. The signature on the deed, 
25 the preparation of the deed was part of that plan. Part of 
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1 the reason I'm feeling that way is because I've not been 
2 given a good reason by the defendant as to why he signed that 
3 otherwise. To say someone hounded you would not cause 
4 someone it seems to me reasonably to sign away something he 
5 did not want to sign away. 
6 MR. THOMAS: There was more than that with respect 
7 to his testimony. I think he testified that he felt it would 
8 be appropriate in case something were to happen to him to 
9 make sure that his children were taken care of. 
10 THE COURT: Okay, and I think he said his wife and 
11 his children. 
12 MR. BRANCH: That's right. 
13 MR. THOMAS: So--
14 THE COURT: And if that's the case isn't that 
15 further evidence of an intent to transfer? His testimony was 
16 his wife and his children in case he died. 
17 MR. THOMAS: I don't believe so because I think 
18 that that is simply, you know, if you will, almost a form of 
19 a poor man's will, if you will, where he's thinking in the 
2 0 event something happens to me during the marriage and we're 
21 doing well then I would want them to have this. But it 
22 certainly wasn't his intent to convey to her his pre-marital 
23 interest in the property and there is a distinction between 
24 that, and I think it's a critical distinction. 
25 It's also noteworthy, just a couple of real 
^0 
